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With every tool man is perfecting his own 
organs, whether motor or sensory, or is 
removing the limits to their functioning. […] 
Man has, as it were, become a prosthetic god. 
When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is 
truly magnificent: but those organs have not 
grown on him and they still give him much 
trouble at times. (Freud 1930: 42, my 
emphasis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This essay is an attempt at investigating some visible forms of complex, indeed 
controversial, embodiment, with the specific intention of concentrating on the ways 
they interrogate delicate issues, such as disability, masculinity and prosthetic sport 
performance. I intend to sound the shifting boundaries between dis-ability and super-
ability as manifested in iconic figures such as Stelarc and, in other (sports) fields, Oscar 
Pistorius, whose unsteady position as privileged/disabled bladerunner seems to 
require – and indeed to attract – particularly intense scrutiny. I shall introduce a few 
contemporary discourses on corporeality and embodiment, which focus on the 
‘troubling’ nature of auxiliary organs Freud refers to in the much contended paragraph 
I use as epigraph. I am well aware of the layers of difficulty arising from Freud's 
obliteration of the feminine, to mention just the most relevant critique against his 
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work suggested by L. Irigaray, for instance. I use this passage only as a cue to my 
intended discourses, without forgetting the unease his use of the term 'Man' does 
cause (me): no 'prosthetic goddess' is envisionable in his writing, transformed like 
'woman' in general into the utterly haunting negative shadow he was allegedly 
obsessed with. I shall try and offer other views of the always gendered and always 
rooted, corporeal 'body' I am here following in its 'prosthetic' perambulations; I shall 
therefore move from Butler and Giddens to Jean-Luc Nancy’s work on transplants 
and/as prostheses to include theoretical debates on disintegrating embodiment and 
disability studies. My concluding remarks will focus on the short-circuiting of allegedly 
secure practices of (masculine) embodiment in sports culture and theory brought 
about by prosthetic questionings of stereotypical subject positions.  
 
 
SOUND(ING) INTEGRITY 
 
In what I find a very rich and demanding essay on the limits, or lack of, of bodily 
integrity, Diane Perpich poses very radical, indeed essential, questions:   
 
What do we mean when we say “here is my body”? What, after all, is a body? Are 
bodies (human bodies, for example) natural kinds? Are they substances? Organic 
wholes? Or is the unity that we accord to the body conventional, arbitrary, and 
linguistic in nature? And in what sense can a body be said to be mine? Where 
exactly are its limits? How or in what sense does it belong to me, and who is this 
me that would be in some sense other than my body? (2005: 81) 
 
Among the issues which are raised in this passage, Perpich hints at debatable legal 
rights to agency and to the entitlement to modifying an allegedly already-extant 
entity – the body, my body – with clear-cut profiles and boundaries. In an early work 
on de Beauvoir, Judith Butler had also, already, stated that “the body is not a static 
phenomenon, but a mode of intentionality, a directional force and a mode of desire” 
(1986: 33, my emphasis). While this would later lead her to her famous contentions on 
the performativity of gender, in this paper I am more interested in following her 
suggestion that “as a condition of access to the world, the body is being comported 
beyond itself, sustaining a necessary reference to the world and, thus, never self-
identical natural entity. The body is lived and experienced as the context and medium of 
all strivings.” (ibid.: 33, my emphasis) The lived, situated aspect of what she terms a 
“comportment beyond itself” ties in with my interest in prosthetics. In his Of 
Grammatology, Jacques Derrida referred to this being beyond in his reading of 
Rousseau’s Confessions: for him, writing (as technology) is a supplement that “signifies 
nothing, [but] simply replaces a lack” (1974: 921); his “logic of the supplement” might 
thus seem to suggest that writing, technology and by analogy body 
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prosthetics/addition/augmentation are necessary attempts at fixing otherwise 
unstable, malfunctioning bodies which are yet to be perfected (1974).  
In very different terms, Anthony Giddens suggests what might, at first face, be 
deemed in opposition to Butler’s arguments, especially when he stresses that 
 
a person’s identity is not to be found in behaviour, nor – important though this is 
– in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going. 
The individual’s biography, if she is to maintain regular interaction with others in 
the day-to-day world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate 
events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing ‘story’ 
about the self.” (1991: 54, my emphasis). 
 
For both scholars, I think, the body lies at the crux between biology and language, as 
articulate medium and as intentional plan alike in an unresolved aporia which must 
remain such. This “mode of intentionality”, especially in connection with Butler’s work, 
has caused intensely heated debates among disability scholars, who argue that the 
American philosopher idealizes her cyborgs and obliterates the very real obstacles 
which disabled people around the world must daily face (see Siebers 2008). It is true 
that, in her work on cyborgs, Haraway refers to “paraplegics and other severely 
handicapped people [who] can (and sometimes do) have the most intense 
experiences of complex hybridization with other communication devices” (Haraway 
1991: 178). Her statements perfectly exemplify what Mitchell and Snyder have bitterly 
remarked on disabled people often being only laterally present in culture as “self-
evident cyborgs of modernity – transhuman subjects who rework the nature/culture 
divide.” (Mitchell and Snyder 1997: 29)  
I aim at adopting the view that the body, ambiguous and uncertain in its borders 
as it might be, may be conceived as a project, as literally, physically, “plastic”. But, in 
doing so, I do not forget that the essential issue at stake here is the vertiginous 
variations that exist in accessing plastic transformation, ie prosthetic technology. 
Furthermore, to go back to Derrida's “logic of the supplement”, one must realize that, 
truly, the very possibilities offered by technological implementation and 
'augmentation' may be read as duplicating “the ableist assumption that disabled 
bodies are broken and require 'fixing'”. (Kafer 2009: 224)  
 
 
SHAPING BODIES 
 
In a careful analysis of such delicate senses of “plasticity”, John Jordan intervenes on 
the issues related to the “refurbishment” of human bodies which, I suggest, have an 
essential bearing both upon disability culture and representation and upon a 
sociology of sport culture and the representation, of idealized, sculpted, perfected 
(fixed?) bodies. 
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The plastic body is a contested subjectivity whose meaning shapes and is shaped 
by the ways that the body can be discussed, by whom, and toward what end, as 
well as the socio-political implications of people seeking to make their bodies 
conform to an idealized image. This perspective differs from the usual ways in 
which plastic surgery is discussed publicly, which is in terms of the end product — 
the visible, post-surgery body. Before a single incision is made, however, the 
plastic body as an object of discourse has been sculpted rhetorically to reflect the 
varied interests of patients, surgeons, and, in some instances, communities. Even 
in situations in which surgery is rejected, a new body is produced because the 
applicant’s body is redefined as unsuitable for surgery, which alters its rhetorical 
status. Approval of surgery is made on the assumption that the refurbished body 
will improve the individual patient and be a public statement affirming the benefits 
and appropriate uses of plastic surgery. Rhetoric, thus, is a vital component of the 
development of bodies in plastic surgery culture, and it influences individual 
decisions about and public knowledge of the human body. (Jordan 2004: 333, my 
emphasis) 
 
If one extends such reasoning to other forms of surgery, namely allegedly 
reconstructive, curative surgery, one may discover a different sense in the prosthetic 
approach I have been trying to put on the agenda. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s words, bodies 
“take place neither in discourse nor in matter. They inhabit neither ‘spirit’ nor ‘body’. 
They take place at the limit, as the limit” (2002: 18). And, to follow again Diane 
Perpich’s refined argument, “every body divides and relates to itself and to others 
along multiple borders. The self is flesh and bone and mineral and water; it is healthy 
tissue and deadly viruses. Rather than defining a self, a corpus records the fault lines of 
the self’s identity, lines that both separate and join the self with itself and with the 
world.” (2005: 85) If bodies are limits, disabled bodies, or the disabled body as 
impossible category, are truly “a nightmare for the fashionable discourse of theory”, in 
the terms offered by Lennard J. Davis (1995: 5). It seems to me quite undeniable, in 
fact, that very rarely have differently-abled subjectivities been under the spotlight of 
critical theory, unless as a symptom of what Ato Quayson has successfully defined 
“aesthetic nervousness” (2007: 26), as a means for “marking the constitutive points of 
aesthetic representation […] in the suspension, collapse, or general shortcircuiting of 
the hitherto dominant protocols of representation that may have governed the text.” 
(ibid.) 
It is in the work by Lennard Davis, who is indeed at the forefront of disability 
studies, that one clearly traces the connecting lines taking disability discourse from 
Georges Canguilhem’s figuration of the “pathological” to Foucault’s docile bodies and 
Davis’s own arguments on “normalcy” and normativity as culturally constructed, yet 
physically perlocutionary discursive orders and political practices. Canguilhem (and 
Butler’s involvement with his teaching is well known) stated that: “there is no 
difference between the birth of grammar [...] and the establishment of the metric 
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system. [...] It began with grammatical norms and ended with morphological norms of 
men and horses for national defense, passing through industrial and sanitary norms” 
(1978: 150). Seen from this stratified perspective, disability can indeed be read as “the 
master trope of human disqualification” (Mitchell, Snyder 2000: 3), in the sense that it 
articulates physical difference as inassimilable, as a biologically and/or culturally 
determined un-fitness to the normate spaces and discourses of modernity (see Price 
2007). 
The so-called medical model of disability – which intended disability as located in 
individual cases and in a pre-eminently corporeal distance from standardized normalcy 
– has long ago been replaced by a social model of disability, which inverted the terms 
of the question and posited a linguistic, structural difference between impairments 
and disabilities. It is true that, as Tom Shakespeare has made clear, this has also forced 
the body out of disability discourse, since “to mention biology, to admit pain, to 
confront […] impairments has been to risk the oppressors seizing on evidence that 
disability is really about physical limitation after all” (1992: 40). In this essay, I suggest 
that the most convincing attitude towards the interpellation of disability is proposed 
by Tobin Siebers, whose Disability Theory is a thorough, somewhat painful, 
investigation into what he terms “complex embodiment”. In his view, this theory 
“raises awareness of the effects of disabling environments on people’s lived 
experience of the body [and] theorizes the body and its representations as mutually 
transformative.” (2008: 25) Mutual transformation and obligation are useful keys to the 
following section of this essay, in which I pose questions related to talking about the 
body, to acting and enacting one’s body, more specifically when it is or becomes dys-
functional (see Leder 1990) and otherwise integrated.  
 
 
FAULTLINES 
 
In his already-mentioned work on disability as nervousness, Ato Quayson introduces a 
chapter on J. M. Coetzee’s Slow Man (2005), a novel the often contested Nobel prize 
winner dedicated to a male, muscular, fit body disfigured due to a street accident. A 
leg is lost, and a “ham” is what seems left in its place; yet the protagonist, Paul 
Rayment, “to himself […] does not call it a stump. He would like not to call it anything; 
he would like not to think about it, but that is not possible. If he has a name for it, it is 
le jambon [the ham]. Le jambon keeps it at a nice, contemptuous distance.” (Coetzee 
2005: 29). From Quayson’s perspective, that leg has become alienated, a mere Körper 
experienced as an objectual other, an intruding “thing”, a transforming prosthesis ante 
litteram. I turn again to Diane Perpich’s work on Nancy, to remind her suggestions in 
relation to L’Intrus, the short text the French philosopher dedicated to his own heart 
transplant and to considering the leaky boundaries of his body and his varied 
proprioceptive perspectives. For Perpich, L’Intrus discloses the body “as a being 
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singular plural through a process of denaturing and defamiliarization that weans us 
from a humanistic conception of body as a unified whole or integrum and thus as 
one’s own in a way that would link identity to this wholeness and integrity.” (ibid.: 80). 
If one considers not only the transplanted organ but all the other “auxiliaries” which 
intervene in the process of reconfiguring the body, in Nancy’s case prostheses are 
imagined not as means for technological empowerment, but as “defamiliarizing” tools 
which seriously interrogate any banal, outmoded, sense of secure identity: 
 
I am the illness and the medical intervention; I am the cancerous cell and the 
grafted organ; I am the immunodepressive agents and their palliatives; I am the 
bits of wire holding together my sternum; and I am this injection site permanently 
sewn into me below my clavicle; just as I was, for that matter, already these screws 
in my hip and this plate in my groin. I am becoming like a science-fiction android, 
or the living-dead, as one day my youngest son says to me” (Nancy 2002: 42-43) 
 
If “identity is immunity and vice versa”, such a relation is marked by “laws of intrusion” 
(Perpich 2005: 83) which may well refer to prostheses and dis/ability. Adopting 
remarkably innovative approaches to the very conception of body property/propriety, 
performers such as Orlan and Stelarc have taken those laws of intrusion – or ex-
scription, to use a different coinage – to their very limit. In her manifesto on “Carnal 
Art”, Orlan has offered her view over (her) body modification (and prosthetic 
reconfigurations): she argues that her artistic experimentation “swings between 
defiguration and refiguration. Its inscription into the flesh is due to the new 
possibilities inherent to our age. The body has become a ‘modified ready-made’, no 
longer seen as the ideal it once represented, not ready enough to be adhered and 
signed.” (2001) In different ways, the Australian performer artist Stelarc has been 
investigating the impact of technology over human bodies and agency, and has been 
sounding the boundaries of ability and super-ability in his grafting a third, functioning 
and web-connected ear onto his arm (see Stelarc 1999). This unnecessary, marginal yet 
totally excessive prosthesis seems to me to function as a monstrous (in the sense of 
extremely visible, perpetually monitored and also, paradoxically, monitoring) faultline, 
a surface which unites, divides and affects the presupposedly demarcating lines 
between the human and the technological, the natural and the cultural, lack and 
excess.  
 
 
FILL IN THE GAP? 
 
Following this line of contention, Sarah Jain also suggested that “a prosthesis can fill a 
gap, but it can also diminish the body and create the need for itself.” (1999: 44) Her 
words lead to my intended main focus, the case and visibly complex embodiment of 
South African athlete Oscar Pistorius, whose in-between status of enhanced 
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masculine/muscular icon and disabled person marks a particularly delicate set of 
radical questionings of disability, gender and sport culture alike. A. Asch and M. Fine 
stated that ‘‘having a disability [is] seen as synonymous with being dependent, 
childlike and helpless — an image fundamentally challenging all that is embodied in 
the ideal male: virility, autonomy and independence’’ (1988: 175). As a matter of fact, 
this “some body” (see Couser 2009) offers a self-narrative which contests any easily 
accepted allegiance and portrays himself as the ideal male the two scholars refer to; in 
fact, in his own words: “I don’t see myself as disabled [...] there is nothing I can’t do that 
able-bodied athletes can do”.(60) Instead of feeling marginalized as inhabiting what 
he publicly devalues as a form of feminized masculinity, Pistorius aligns himself with 
what Norman and Moola call “the institution of modernist sport [as] a manifestation of 
liberal humanism that assumes an organic body and a self-contained human subject.” 
(2011: 1271). Indeed, after the polemical debates following his attempt at and 
eventual failure in participating in the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, Pistorius’s body, 
his auxiliary organs, his extremely sophisticated Cheetah blades, the (allegedly 
accidental) shooting of his girlfriend have become a crucial network of topical 
discourses on empowerment and the intrusion of technology in the construction and 
policing of gender, class, race borders. 
Norman and Moola concentrate on a 2013 Time magazine cover story on 
Pistorius which tied the revealing title of Man/Superman/Gunman to a previous 
photograph of the athlete posing as Terminator, in a posture which carefully 
reproduced stereotypical features of hegemonic white masculinity while also, 
obviously, hinting at cyborg representation and potential. In their view, though, 
“athletes [are] ‘always already cyborgified’. Sport is a central discursive site for 
producing and reproducing the modern body.” (ibid.: 1274) Yet, in mainstream sports 
competitions, able and disabled bodies almost never meet on an equal field; while it is 
undeniable that Paralympic Games have become growingly popular, the actual 
coverage of those events in mainstream media remains marginal and proves the utter 
topicality of DePauw’s insights into the lack of visibility of disabled athletes and 
bodies: “the object of our study is the body or specific aspects of the performing body, 
but traditionally our study has not focused on the body as whole, the body in a social 
context, or the body in connection with self” (1997: 419). Pistorius has, instead, been 
made extremely visible, indeed obsessively scrutinized from numerous different 
cultural and scientific points of view, all attesting to the extreme potential 
transgressivity of his multiply complex embodiment. To start with, the very materiality 
of his prostheses has caused intense debate and scrutiny, apparently with the declared 
intent of examining the validity of the accusations of annihilating fair competition 
through the use of his carbon-fibre blades. For some (scientists and scholars), those 
prosthetic tools enhance his athletic performance and transform him into a super-
able, super-human theoretically unbeatable running machine. Pistorius defends 
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himself by adopting fair play – a major trope of stereotypically gentlemanly attitude in 
sports discourse – as his own master narrative and motivation: 
 
I believe in the purity of sport. I don’t like people who take short cuts. I’d never be 
involved in sport if I had the slightest doubts. It does get to me quite hard. The 
worst thing is when somebody says my improvements this year are down to 
changing my prosthetic legs. My prosthetic legs have stayed the same for seven 
years, down to the bolts and the lining. Then I read somewhere that my legs travel 
faster than those of an able-bodied sprinter. In sprinting, your opposite arm and 
opposite leg travel together, so that would mean I am having to move my arms 
faster, which means I am having to burn more energy in my upper body. (2011) 
 
By referring to the energy expenditure his performance requires, Pistorius tries to 
reach a balance between the homosocial bonds siding him with the other able-bodied 
athletes, but also threatens to destabilize other bonds and boundaries (see Swartz and 
Watemeyer 2008). His status at the time of the games he vainly attempted to 
participate in (he did later succeed in participating in both the 2012 London Olympics 
and Paralympics Games) was marginalized, legally contested although apparently 
elitarian and dominant; Anne Hickey-Moody proposes a very brilliant reading of the 
complex material relation triggered by the use of carbon fibre. According to her: 
“Carbon fibre is […] the homosocial technology that propelled Pistorius beyond the 
socio-cultural politics of disability […] and the surface that connects him to global 
assemblages of sporting masculinity.” (2015: 146) The cases of other athletes and 
celebrities, Aimee Mullins and Heather Mills as notable examples, would indeed have 
bent Hickey-Moody's discourse to different conclusions and a more militant reading of 
gendered disabled bodies. Mullins, as actress, model and athlete, does indeed 
interrogate that concept of sporting 'masculinity', by reappropriating her dis-ability 
and claiming her rights to choose as many prostheses as she likes. In one of the many 
campaigns featuring her, in fact, she seems to be powerfully advocating the will of 
“walking in different shoes”. 
For Hickey-Moody, by transforming Pistorius's into a body colonized by an 
innovative material amalgam, carbon fibre “extends the surfaces of bodies and 
produces masculinity on and across surfaces, male and female bodies.” (ibid.: 139). If 
one widens the scope of her discourse and introduces correctives to the apparently 
rigid sense the word 'masculinity' retains in this passage, or rather opts for a more 
politically-informed 'agency', it seems undeniable that both Pistorius and Mullins 
are/have acquired (due to their undoubtedly, unforgettably, class, race, and gender 
privileged positions) a posthuman, disabled, superable, impossible body (although 
carefully presented - and marketed - as 'simply' sexually attractive and socially 
powerful): 
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Posthuman bodies are the causes and effects of postmodern relations of power 
and pleasure, virtuality and reality, sex and its consequences…a technology, a 
screen, a projected image; it is a body under the sign of AIDS, a contaminated 
body, a deadly body, a techno-body…a queer body. The human body itself is no 
longer part of ‘the family of man’ but a zoo of posthumanities. (Halberstam and 
Livingston 1995: 3) 
 
If, as Rebecca Coleman seems to suggest, it is necessary “to account for […] [the things 
that] limit or extend [bodies]” (2009: 163), and if this contention leads us back to 
Freud’s fruitful “prosthetic god[s]”, one may well conclude with Diane Perpich’s 
questioning of embodiment and also with Gregory Bateson’s early essay on the 
cybernetics of identity: “If you ask anybody about the localization and boundaries of 
the self... confusions are immediately displayed. [C]onsider a blind man with a stick. 
Where does the blind man’s self begin? At the tip of the stick? At the handle of the 
stick? Or at some point halfway up the stick?” (Bateson 1971: 7). To conclude, current 
theoretical work on corpo-reality, disability discourse, cultural disability studies and 
the sociology and cultural analysis of sports culture may well be seen as sharing a 
common framework, with sport, fashion and celebrity culture taking the lead in 
articulating, influencing and reproducing cultural icons which have already had an 
extremely profound impact on modern senses of collective and individual belonging 
and on an essential, often unpredictable, revision of prescribed boundaries and 
policed behaviours. 
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